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Abstract
Background: This paper compares the direct benefits to the State of Western
Australia from employing a “suppression” policy response to the COVID-19 pan-
demic rather than a “herd immunity” approach.
Methods: An S-I-R (susceptible-infectious-resolved) model is used to estimate the
likely benefits of a suppression COVID-19 response compared to a herd immunity
alternative. Direct impacts of the virus are calculated on the basis of sick leave, hospi-
talizations, and fatalities, while indirect impacts related to response actions are
excluded.
Results: Preliminary modeling indicates that approximately 1700 vulnerable person
deaths are likely to have been prevented over 1 year from adopting a suppression
response rather than a herd immunity response, and approximately 4500 hospitaliza-
tions. These benefits are valued at around AUD4.7 billion. If a do nothing policy had
been adopted, the number of people in need of hospitalization is likely to have over-
whelmed the hospital system within 50 days of the virus being introduced. Maximum
hospital capacity is unlikely to be reached in either a suppression policy or a herd
immunity policy.
Conclusion: Using early international estimates to represent the negative impact
each type of policy response is likely to have on gross state product, results suggest
the benefit–cost ratio for the suppression policy is slightly higher than that of the
herd immunity policy, but both benefit–cost ratios are less than one.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
Since an outbreak of a novel coronavirus (COVID-19) was detected in
Wuhan, China, in late-2019, the virus has quickly spread throughout
the world. The resultant pandemic has seen governments
implementing policies to reduce the morbidity and mortality from
acute infections.1 While mitigating the spread of the virus, however,
these response policies have had large impacts on societies and
economies.1,2 Despite having to react to the virus quickly, it is still
important that governments use traditional policy evaluation tools like
benefit–cost analysis to evaluate the net effects of alternative
response strategies on their constituents.
The detection of COVID-19 in Western Australia in February
2020 provides an example of a response by a discrete region where
the State government declared a State of Emergency shortly after the
first detection, providing police and other services jurisdiction to
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enforce quarantine and self-isolation measures to contain spread. This
response, termed “suppression,” is consistent with policies
implemented by governments around the world aimed at slowing and
eventually reversing epidemic growth, reducing case numbers to low
levels, and maintaining that situation indefinitely.3
As an alternative, the Western Australian government could have
chosen to follow a different management strategy based on the prin-
ciple of “herd immunity.” A herd immunity response policy assumes
the likelihood of an infected individual coming into contact with a sus-
ceptible individual is lessened with a proportion of the population (but
not all) being immune.4,5 This effect may soon be achieved through
widespread vaccination, but given the disease-induced herd immunity
level for COVID-19 is relatively low,6 it could be achieved by allowing
infections and recovery to occur in less-vulnerable sections of the
population. Sweden has officially adopted this natural science herd
immunity approach in its COVID-19 mitigation strategy.7
This paper describes an S-I-R (susceptible-infectious-resolved)
model that is used to estimate the likely benefits of a suppressed
COVID-19 response compared to a herd immunity alternative. A
1-year period from the time of the virus' initial introduction is simu-
lated, and the resultant number of infections, hospitalizations, and
deaths is estimated for these two policy scenarios and for a counter-
factual “do nothing” scenario in which the virus spreads through the
population without concentrated efforts to contain it. The model
allows for the possibility of the Western Australian hospital system
crashing under the strain of COVID-19 cases.
Section 2 outlines the model used to generate COVID-19 infec-
tion numbers under different response policies and its parameteriza-
tion. Section 3 presents model outputs; specifically, the number of
cases expected in Western Australia under suppression and herd
immunity responses, the direct costs of each policy, the effect of each
policy on the State's hospital sector, and the sensitivity of costs to
uncertainties in model parameters. Section 4 uses the results and
recent anecdotal evidence of response costs to present an indicative




A simple S-I-R model is used to simulate the spread of COVID-19
through the Western Australia population. Its components are:
St ¼ St1R0βIt1 St1St0
 
ð1Þ
It ¼ It1þR0βIt1 St1St0
 
 γ 1δIA It1 γδIAIt1 ð2Þ
Rt ¼Rt1þ γIt1 ð3Þ
N¼ Stþ ItþRt ð4Þ
In Equations (1)-(4), St is the number of susceptible individuals
within a population N in time period t after the initial introduction of
the virus who have not been infected; It is the number of people
within the population in period t who are infected and can transmit
the virus; Rt is the number of resolved cases in period t who are no
longer capable of transmitting the virus, including those who have ret-
urned to health and those who have died; R0 is the average number of
people that one infectious person will go on to infect; β is the final
outbreak size expressed as a proportion of the total susceptible popu-
lation; γ is the resolution rate of infections; δI is the case fatality rate
among people with a high risk of severe infection; and A is the propor-
tion of the population at high risk of severe infection.
Equation (1) states that the number of susceptible individuals in
the population at time t is equal to the number of susceptible people
in the previous period minus newly infected individuals. While
acknowledging that under certain conditions the size of an epidemic
can be predicted by R0,
8-10 small variations in these conditions can
lead to very different-sized epidemics.11 Rather than specifying the
complex relationship between R0 and β, the simple model presented
here assumes they are independent variables.
Equation (2) states that the number of people capable of trans-
mitting the virus (or infectives) in period t is equal to the number of
infectives in the previous period plus the number of new infectives
minus the number of resolved infections. Resolved infections are
those that have resulted in either a return to relative health or death,
and as such transmission can no longer occur. Both resolutions are
assumed to take the same number of periods to resolve, 1γ . Note that
this specification of Equation (2) assumes nobody outside the group
at high risk of severe infection dies from the virus.
Equation (3) states that the number of people who have been
infected with the virus and can no longer transmit it (ie, recovered or
deceased) in time period t is equal to the number of resolved cases in
the previous time period plus the number of newly resolved cases.
The number of fatal infections is partially dependent on the ability
of the hospital system to cope with the number of COVID-19
patients. When hospitals reach capacity, patients must be turned
away and cared for at other locations (eg, home care, hospices, make-
shift triage centers, etc.) where the case fatality rate for those at risk
of severe infections is higher than in hospital care. The number of
fatal infections t days after virus introduction, Dt, is determined by the
piecewise function:
Dt ¼ Dt1þ γδ
IAIt if ηIt ≤Bt
Dt1þ γδIABtþ γδEA ηItBtð Þ if ηIt >Bt
(
ð5Þ
Here, Dt is number of deceased individuals within a population N
in time period t after the virus is introduced; η is the proportion of
infected individuals requiring hospitalization; Bt is the number of hos-
pital beds available for COVID-19 patients on day t after virus intro-
duction; and δE is the case fatality rate among people with a high risk
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of severe infection who are turned away from hospitals when no beds
are available (ie, δE> δI).
Equation (5) states that if the number of infected individuals
requiring hospitalization does not exceed capacity, the number of
deaths attributable to COVID-19 t days after the virus is introduced is
equal to previous deaths plus the number of new deaths among those
at high risk of severe infection. If hospitals reach capacity, new deaths
include infected individuals at high risk of severe infection turned
away from hospitals who experience higher case fatality rates than
similar patients in hospital care.
By simulating values for It and Dt from Equations (2) and (4), costs
imposed by COVID-19 can be estimated as it moves through the
Western Australia population. The costs related to nonfatal infections
t days after virus introduction, CIt, are:
CIt ¼
It ηHþωWð Þ if Itη≤Bt
ηHBtþωWItþE ItηBtð Þ if Itη>Bt

ð6Þ
Here, H is the cost of that hospitalization; ω is the proportion of
infected individuals in need of sick leave; W is the average fortnightly
wage rate (ie, assuming two working weeks are lost as a result of ill-
ness); and E is the extra costs society pays to treat those turned away
from hospitals in other locations.
Equation (6) states that if the number of cases is less than the num-
ber of available hospital beds, the costs related to nonfatal infections
will depend on the number of infected individuals requiring hospitaliza-
tion, the cost of hospitalization, the number of people who require time
off work to recover from the virus, and the average fortnightly wage. If
the number of cases is greater than the capacity of the State's hospitals,
the costs related to nonfatal infections depend on the maximum num-
ber of beds and the cost of hospitalization, the number of people who
require time off work to recover from the virus, and the average fort-
nightly wage, plus the societal costs involved in providing care for those
patients turned away from hospitals.
The cost of fatal infections at time t days after the introduction of
the virus, CDt is calculated as:
CDt ¼DtL ð7Þ
Here, Dt is the number of fatal infections occurring t days after
the virus is introduced to the population; and L is the value of a statis-
tical life—a measure of the willingness of individuals to pay for a
reduction in mortality risk sufficient to lower the expected number of
fatalities by one over a given period of time.
Equation (7) states that the cost of fatal infection costs will be
determined by the number of fatal infections and the statistical value
of lives lost.
With simulated values for CIt and C
D
t , the combined total nonfatal







In the results section, CIt , C
D
t , and C
T are reported for: (a) the
counterfactual “do nothing” policy in which the virus is permitted to
spread throughout the Western Australian population without special
measures to slow infection, (b) the suppression policy reflecting the
policy currently in place, and (c) a herd immunity scenario in
which the virus is allowed to spread through the nonvulnerable por-
tion of the population while vulnerable portion is protected through
isolation.
Specifically, the do nothing scenario involves no restrictions to
people movements or behavior being enforced by the Western
Australian government. This does not mean people will not take per-
sonal decisions to minimize risks associated with virus spread, such
as social distancing, self-isolating when ill, or wearing face masks in
public. With the widespread media coverage of the spread and
impact of COVID-19, particularly in other parts of the world, it is
reasonable to expect Western Australians to adopt these measures
regardless. However, in the do nothing scenario, they are not made
mandatory.
The suppression scenario involves a State of Emergency declara-
tion providing the Western Australian police force and Chief Health
Officer with the jurisdiction to enforce quarantine and self-isolation
measures consistent with the national response management
approach. This includes the closure of schools, daycare centers, and
nonessential businesses. Anyone arriving into the State from overseas
or interstate is required to self-isolate for 14 days, and strict border
controls for road, rail, air, and sea entry points are in place. Nonessen-
tial indoor gatherings of >100 people are prohibited, and a “one per-
son per four square metres of floor space” applies. It is assumed that
these measures have the effect of lowering the transmission of the
COVID-19 virus, reflected in a lower R0 value and lower A parameter
when compared to the do nothing approach.
The herd immunity response entails the isolation and protection
of susceptible members of the population, while the virus is permitted
to spread unabated through the nonvulnerable population. Schools
and businesses would remain open, and the borders open to interstate
and international passengers. Restrictions would apply to the move-
ment of and contacts with vulnerable members of the population,
including the elderly, people with pre-existing medical conditions, and
newborns. It is assumed that these measures would result in R0 and A
values that are lower than those expected in the do nothing scenario,
but higher than those expected under the suppression policy scenario.
Note that full details of the specification of parameter values are pro-
vided in Section 2.2.
The total benefit achieved by pursuing either the suppression
policy (BTS ) or herd immunity policy (B
T
H ) over n days is measured by
avoided costs and, therefore, is calculated as the difference in total
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Here, CTD , C
T
S , and C
T
H are the total nonfatal and fatal infection
costs likely to occur over n days under do nothing, suppression, and
herd immunity response policies, respectively.
Based on the parameter values specified in Section 2.2, the virus
simulation is run for 365 days following an initial introduction. Using
the Monte Carlo method, 10 000 iterations of the input model
defined in this section are run to generate probability distributions of
possible outcomes. The results reveal all possible events that could
happen according to the model's structure and parameters, and the
probability of each outcome occurring.
2.2 | Parameters
Model parameters and their assumed values, drawn from the relevant
literature, appear in Table 1 and are discussed below. Pert distribu-
tions are preferred when evidence and expert opinions on parameter
values are mixed,12 and uniform distributions are used to represent
highly uncertain parameters.
The total population of Western Australia is currently
2 590 290.13 This value is used for the parameter N.
Preliminary estimates of the R0 for COVID-19 indicate a broad
range of values between 1.4 and 4.0.11,14-16 It is specified in the
model using the pert distribution pert(1.5,2.5,3.5) under the do noth-
ing scenario. Following Ferguson et al,3 it is assumed actions taken in
the suppression policy option (ie, social distancing, case isolation,
household quarantine, and school and university closures) will reduce
R0 to close to one, although a range of possibilities is considered. R0 is
assumed to change by uniform (75%,30%) under the suppression
policy and by uniform(15%,5%) under the herd immunity policy.
The final outbreak size expressed as a proportion of the total sus-
ceptible population, β, is estimated to be between 5% and 40%.11 This
wide range reflects differing accounts of its breadth in different coun-
tries. It is specified in the model using a narrower distribution, pert
(0.25,0.3,0.35).
The resolution rate, γ, is the inverse of the infectious period for
an average person. Early indications are that the γ is around 33%.17 It
is specified in the do nothing scenario as pert(0.3,0.325,0.35). Under
the herd immunity policy, the average infected person is likely to be
of a younger age than in either the do nothing or suppression scenar-
ios. Therefore, a higher resolution rate of pert(0.33,0.358,0.385) is
assumed, representing a 10% increase.
Similarly, the case fatality rate, δI, is likely to fall as the composi-
tion of infectives changes according to the scenario. For the popula-
tion as a whole, it is specified as pert(0.007,0.01,0.014)18-20 and is
assumed constant over the do nothing and suppression scenarios. As
the average age of infectives is younger in the herd immunity sce-
nario, the case fatality rate is reduced by 10% to pert
(0.006,0.009,0.013). The importance of this specification is discussed
in the sensitivity analysis in Section 3.4.
The proportion of the population at greatest risk, A, is approxi-
mated using age demographic data for Western Australia.13 This is
shown in Figure 1, below. Assuming people between the ages of 70
and 100+ to be at the highest risk,3,21 this accounts for approximately
10% of the Western Australian population. Allowing variability around
this mean value, A is specified in the model as pert (5%,10%,15%).
Using Ferguson et al3 as a broad indication of social distancing effects,
its parameter value is changed by uniform (90%,75%) and uniform
(75%,50%) under the suppression and herd immunity policies,
respectively.
Nguyen-Van-Tam et al22 estimated the proportion of infections
requiring hospitalization (η) for the 2009 H1N1 influenza pandemic at
around 1%. Supposing the hospitalization rate of COVID-19 infections
is at least this high, it is assumed to be between 1.0% and 2.2% [ie,
pert(0.01,0.016,0.022)] in the do nothing scenario. This is assumed to
change by 20% under the suppression policy [ie, Pert
(0.008,0.012,0.016] and by 10% under the herd immunity policy [ie,
Pert(0.009,0.014,0.018)].
The cost of hospitalization, H, is specified as $4600 per day in
today's dollars,23 with an average length of hospital stay of 3 to 9 days
with a most likely duration of 5 days.24
The proportion of infections requiring time off work, ω, is
assumed to be between 3% and 13% [ie, uniform(0.03,0.13)]. This dis-
tribution is estimated on the basis that approximately 80% of people
infected with COVID-19 show mild symptoms, while 20% exhibit
more severe symptoms,21,25 and around 64% of people infected are
likely to be of working age.13 When infected workers do stay at home,
it is assumed they are absent for two full weeks of work. Hence, the
average fortnightly wage for Western Australian workers is used to
approximate the parameter W. A value of $2660/fortnight is used.26
Given the majority of 70+ year olds are retired from the workforce,
this parameter is assumed constant across the three scenarios.
It is difficult to estimate the cost society incurs as a result of addi-
tional care for excess patients turned away from hospitals when
capacity is reached, E. These patients require adequate nursing avail-
ability, 24-hour on-call medical advice and home support, patient-
centered planning, daily nursing review and adjustment of individual
care plan, professional multidisciplinary team support (eg, occupa-
tional therapy, physiotherapy, social work), and a discharge hand-over
to ongoing support services.27,28 Without economies of scale, the
marginal cost of these services tends to be higher in makeshift facili-
ties or homes than in hospitals, and the duration of health episodes
can be longer.29 The cost of providing services to infected patients
turned away hospitals is assumed to be double the hospitalization
costs, H.28
The case fatality rate of patients turned away from hospitals, δE,
is also difficult to estimate. Various studies have shown a negligible
difference in treatment outcome between patients utilizing home hos-
pital care and those treated in hospitals.28,30-33 Notably, Vianello
et al34 also found no statistical difference in treatment failure rate for
patients treated for respiratory tract infections at home or in hospital.
However, no COVID-19-specific estimates are available. In the
absence of empirical evidence and to allow for a range of possibilities,
it is assumed δE> δI by a factor of uniform (0%,50%).
The age-adjusted value of a statistical life, L, represents the mar-
ginal rate of substitution between wealth and mortality risk corrected
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for the age of the population studied.35 In a review of empirical esti-
mates relevant to Australia, Abelson36 recommended a value of a sta-
tistical life of $3.5 million, which was later revised to $4.2 million,37 or
$4.7 million today's dollars. If everyone faced the same risk of fatal
COVID-19 infection and statistical life value was identical, this figure
could simply be multiplied by the number of COVID-19 deaths
prevented over time in each policy scenario to give the total value of
lives saved.38 However, those at risk of fatal COVID-19 infection are
disproportionately elderly.39-41 The parameter L in the current study
was estimated by dividing the value of a statistical life by the average
remaining life expectancy for the population and then multiplying
through by the expected years of life extension attributable to each
policy.42 So, given the average life expectancy in Western Australia is
83.2 years,43 and avoidance of COVID-19 infection has an expected
life extension of 5-10 years, L is $0.3-0.6 million.
In view of the uncertainty of the assumed parameter values in
this analysis, the results in the following section are presented first on
the basis of the initial specification outlined in this section and subse-
quently are subjected to a sensitivity analysis.
3 | RESULTS
3.1 | Spread
Figure 2 shows the number of people affected by the COVID-19 virus
as it spreads through the Western Australian population. Panels (A),
(B), and (C) depict the do nothing, herd immunity, and suppression
scenarios, respectively, with expected values for S, I, and R shown
over 365 days following initial introduction. To produce this figure,
parameters in the model are held at their mean values.
Panels (A) and (B) show that the numbers of nonfatal infections
are expected to peak at approximately 550 000 cases and 450 000
cases 40-60 days after the virus' introduction under the do nothing
and herd immunity scenarios, respectively. Infections return to near-
zero cases 60-70 days after introduction. This compares to approxi-
mately 1 000 infections in the suppression scenario over the whole
year, although this is difficult to see in panel (C) due to scaling.
Also difficult to see in the figure is the number of fatal infections
expected, which reach a maximum of around 7 000 under the do
nothing scenario 60-70 days after the virus' introduction. Under the
herd immunity scenario, deaths are expected to reach a maximum of
approximately 1 700 over the same period, while nine fatalities are
predicted in the suppression scenario. This closely matches observa-
tions, with the State having recorded nine deaths from 910 cases as
of February 2021 (Department of Health Western Australia, 2021).
3.2 | Benefits
Figure 3 compares the nonfatal infection costs, fatal infection costs,
and total costs anticipated under do nothing, herd immunity, and sup-
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estimates the total benefits in terms of avoided costs of the herd
immunity and suppression scenarios relative to do nothing (right
panels [D], [E], and [F]). Once again, parameter values are held at their
mean values to create this figure.
Using the age-adjusted value of a statistical life measure and
average parameter values, panel (C) shows that the costs related to
COVID-19 fatalities are expected to reach a maximum of $2.8 billion
40-60 days after its introduction under a do nothing scenario. This is
reduced to approximately $0.7 billion after 60-80 days under a herd
immunity policy, and approximately $3.8 million after 230-240 days
under a suppression policy. The total benefits in terms of avoided fatal
infections costs at the end of the 365 days, shown in panel (F), are
approximately $2.1 billion for the herd immunity policy and $2.9 bil-
lion for the suppression policy.
Panel (B) shows the costs of nonfatal infections under each sce-
nario. Under a do nothing policy, costs related to nonfatal infections
are expected to reach a maximum of just over $8.7 billion 40-60 days
after introduction. A herd immunity policy reduces these costs to a
maximum of $6.5 billion 60-80 days after introduction, while a sup-
pression policy reduces nonfatal infection costs to a maximum of
$60.0 million 340-360 days after introduction. The total benefits
related to nonfatal infections after 1 year, shown in panel (E), are
approximately $2.1 billion for the herd immunity policy and $8.6 bil-
lion for the suppression policy.
Panel (D) indicates the combined nonfatal infection benefits and
fatal infection benefits in terms of avoided costs for the herd immu-
nity and suppression scenarios relative to the do nothing scenario.
Total benefits are negligible for around 30 days after COVID-19 intro-
duction. They then spike to a peak of around $11.5 billion in the sup-
pression scenario and $8.2 billion in the herd immunity scenario after
40-60 days, coinciding with the sudden rise in cases in the do nothing
scenario. Total benefits of heard immunity return to a steady state of
$4.2 billion 60-80 days after COVID-19 introduction.
3.3 | Hospitalizations
The number of infections requiring hospitalization is expected to
strain the Western Australian health sector, and in the case of the do
nothing scenario may overwhelm it. Figures released in 2019 indicate
the combined number of beds in Western Australian public and pri-
vate hospitals is 9 949.44 Assuming that approximately one-third of
these beds will be occupied by patients with other needs, this leaves
around 6 600 beds available at any one time for COVID-19 patients.
If the number of infected individuals requiring hospitalization exceeds
this capacity, excess patients will be unable to access appropriate
care. As stated in Equation (6), the model assumes these cases have a
higher likelihood of resulting in death.
Figure 4 shows the number of people expected to present to the
State's public and private hospitals over 365 days, and compares this to
the estimated number of hospital beds available. As before, parameters
are set to their mean values to produce the figure. Maximum hospital
capacity is not expected to be reached under a herd immunity or sup-
pression policy, but under a do nothing scenario, the number of people
in need of hospitalization is expected to surpass the number of hospital
beds 40-50 days after COVID-19 is introduced to the population.
The number of patients turned away when hospitals are at full
capacity under a do nothing policy is estimated to be 1 600. Referring
back to Figure 3, the effects of the health system crashing can be seen
by the rapid escalation of costs in panels (A)-(C). As capacity is reached,
patients turned away result in higher patient care costs and risk of fatal-
ities, causing a rapid escalation of costs under the do nothing scenario.
3.4 | Sensitivity analysis
To determine the effect of uncertain parameter values on model out-























































F IGURE 1 Age of the Western Australian
population, 2019.13 People of age 70+ are
deemed to be at the highest risk of fatal infection,
representing 10% of the total population
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holding all other parameters constant in Figure 5. Here, the top
10 parameters producing the most change are ranked from top to bot-
tom according to their strength of influence on the total benefit (BT) in
each response scenario. Panel (A) shows sensitivity results for the
herd immunity policy (ie, BTH , with a mean value of $4.3 billion) and
panel (B) for the suppression policy (ie, BTS , with a mean value of $9.2
billion).
In panels (A) and (B), results are highly sensitive to changes in the
cost of hospitalization. The length of time COVID-19 patients stay in
hospital and subsequent costs depend on their symptoms, which vary
in severity. Hospital care can vary from general ward–based care to
intensive care where patients may be intubated for mechanical venti-
lation.24,45 Hospitalization cost has a positive relationship with total
benefits, and because the input distribution is right-skewed, the right-
hand-side sensitivity bar is longer than the left. Changing hospitaliza-
tion costs from $23 000 in the base case to $13 800 (a change of
40%) lowers total benefit from $4.3 billion to $3.6 billion (16%) in
the herd immunity scenario and from $9.2 billion to $5.5 billion
(40%) in the suppression scenario. Conversely, increasing its value
to $41 400 (80%) increases the total benefit to $5.0 billion (16%) in
the herd immunity scenario and $11.3 billion (23%) in the suppression
scenario.
The age-adjusted value of a statistical life is also a highly sensitive
parameter in both scenarios. Lowering its value from the mid-point
value of $422 500 to $280 000 (a change of 34%) changes total
benefits of the herd immunity policy by 16% (to $3.6 billion) and by
9% in the suppression scenario (to $8.4 billion). Likewise, increasing
it to $565 000 (a change of +34%) increases the total benefit by
approximately 14% (to $4.9 billion) in the herd immunity scenario and
by 10% (to $10.1 billion) in the suppression scenario.
In view of its sensitivity, problems with the age-adjusted value of
a statistical life used in this study need to be recognized. Its derivation
assumes a linear relationship between age and the value of a statisti-
cal life, but in practice, this is highly uncertain.42 Evidence suggests
the relationship may in fact follow lifetime consumption patterns,
being low early and late in life and high in the middle.46 Moreover,
quality of life is not captured in the age-adjusted value of a statistical
life, meaning the value of life years spent in discomfort due to poor
health is considered the same as those spent in good health. However,
methods that apply a discount to years of ill-health or disability, ter-
med “quality adjusted life years,” are problematic, particularly in terms
fairness. Negative social perceptions of medical conditions inflate the
perceived social benefit of interventions to address them, unfairly
raising the value of quality adjusted life years for worse conditions.47
Similarly, the more treatable a condition, the higher the perceived
social benefit of sufferers receiving treatment before those suffering
from less-treatable conditions.48
Figure 5 also shows the results to be sensitive to the rate of
infective hospitalization, with changes in the value of this parame-
ter positively related to the level of benefits in both scenarios. In
addition, note from Figure 5 that the benefit results are not partic-
ularly sensitive to the specification of fatalities outlined in Sec-
tion 2—with the proportion of the population at high risk of severe
infection near the bottom of both panels (A) and (B). However, the
case fatality rate (δI) is ranked higher in panel (A) than in panel
(B) because of the higher number of infectives in the herd immu-
nity scenario, while the case fatality rate for patients turned away
from hospitals (δE) ranks outside the top 10 parameter sensitivities
so does not appear in Figure 5. This is because the number of hos-
pitalizations remains below hospital capacity in both the herd
immunity and suppression scenarios (Figure 4). The issue of sensi-
tivity of the results to the specification of the model is further con-
sidered in Section 4.
4 | DISCUSSION OF BENEFITS RELATIVE
TO COSTS
To put the total benefits of each policy into perspective, they can be
represented as a proportion of the Gross State Product (GSP) of the






































































































































































































































S I R D
F IGURE 2 Predicted COVID-19 infection in Western Australia
over 365 days. Panels A-C show the number of susceptibles,
infectives, and resolved cases over time in the do nothing, herd
immunity, and suppression scenarios, respectively
COOK ET AL. 7 of 12
Domestic Product (GDP) but at a State level, capturing income accruing
to all individuals and businesses in the economy. Moreover, on this
basis, a break-even economic cost for the policy in terms of its negative
impact on GSP can be estimated—thereby indicating the societal cost
of implementing a policy that will exactly offset the benefits it is likely













Here, PS and PH are the break-even economic costs for suppres-
sion and herd immunity policies expressed as a percentage of GSP.
Given the 2018/19 GSP of Western Australia was $260.6
billion,49 histograms of PH and PS are show in Figure 6. Results indi-
cate mean PH is approximately 1.6% of GSP over the 365-day period
simulated in the model (ie, $4.3 billion), whereas estimated mean PS is
3.5% of GSP (ie, $9.2 billion).
It is too early to have rigorous estimates of the negative economic
impact of both types of policy response in terms of decline in GSP
with which to compare these estimates of benefits. However, early
estimates of the impact of Sweden's herd immunity approach to virus
response suggest an overall negative GDP impact for 2020 of
between 4% and 6.7% of Sweden's GDP.50,51 Early estimates of the
broadly suppression type of response for the EU as a whole suggest
an overall negative GDP impact for 2020 of between 5% and 12% of
EU GDP.52
The mid-points of each of these sets of estimates put the eco-
































































(a) Combined Cost of Fatal and Non-Fatal Infections




































































(b) Cost of Non-Fatal Infections
































































(c) Cost of Fatal Infections







































































































































































































(f) Total Benefit: Fatal Infections
Herd immunity Suppression
F IGURE 3 Estimated total benefits of COVID-19 response policies in Western Australia over 365 days. For each policy, the combined fatal
and nonfatal infection costs are shown in panel A, nonfatal infection costs in panel B, and fatal infection costs in panel C. The combined total
benefits of the herd immunity and suppression scenarios relative to do nothing are shown in panel D. The value of avoided nonfatal infections is
shown in panel E, and the value of avoided fatal infections is shown in panel F
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5.4% of Sweden's GDP and the economic cost of the EU's suppres-
sion approach at 8.5% of the EU's GDP. Using these estimates to illus-
trate the economic cost of the two policy responses on Western
Australia's GSP suggests that the estimated mid-point benefits of the
herd immunity response are greater than the mid-point costs, and the -
mid-point benefits of the suppression policy are just less than the
mid-point costs:
1. Herd immunity: Mid-point Benefits = 1.6% < Mid-point
costs = 5.4%
2. Suppression: Mid-point benefits = 3.5% < Mid-point costs = 8.5%
On this basis, both policy responses are likely to result in a sub-
stantial net loss. The herd immunity policy response represents an
estimated (mid-point) benefit–cost ratio (BCR) of 0.3, while suppres-
































































Do nothing Herd immunity Suppression
F IGURE 4 Predicted number of hospitalizations under do
nothing, herd immunity and suppression response policies. Patient
numbers are expected to exceed the maximum capacity of Western
Australian hospitals in the do nothing scenario, but not in either the
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R0 - Suppression
Cost of hospitalisation
Rate of infective hospitalisation - Suppression
Age adjusted value of a statistical life
Propn of infectives requiring time off work
Case fatality rate
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Size of epidemic as propn of total pop.
Total benefit ($ billion)
(B) Suppression
F IGURE 5 Sensitivity analysis. The length of the bars corresponding to each parameter indicates how responsive the total benefit is to
changes in respective parameters. Panel A shows parameter sensitivities for the herd immunity scenario, and panel B parameter sensitivities in
the suppression scenario
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However, as always, there is considerable uncertainty involved in
creating such estimates, and so given the closeness of the estimated
BCRs for the two policy responses and that they are both <1, no sug-
gestion as yet exists that one policy response is superior to the other.
Similarly, if new information reveals, for example, higher hospitaliza-
tion costs for the virus than specified here, then the BCRs of both pol-
icy responses would be increased.
However, wider impacts of each policy on Western Australian
society have been omitted from this assessment that could lower the
BCRs substantially. This is particularly true of the suppression option
where lockdown periods in Australia have been linked to increased
health risks associated with diet and exercise,53 heart attack,54 mental
health,55 alcohol abuse,56 and domestic violence.57 Then again, there
may also be additional benefits omitted that would serve to increase
the BCR. For example, incidences of violent crime and resultant physi-
cal injuries may be reduced under lockdown conditions ordered under
the suppression policy.58 More research is needed on these broader
societal impacts of response actions before a comprehensive policy
assessment can be made.
5 | CONCLUSION
This analysis relies on an S-I-R model to predict the likely spread of
COVID-19 infections through the Western Australian population over
a period of 365 days under different response policies. Results sug-
gest the societal benefit achieved by a herd immunity response would
be approximately $4.3 billion in terms of prevented fatalities, hospital-
izations, and sick leave. This is equivalent to 1.6% of total 2018/19
GSP for the state. In comparison, the estimated benefit of a suppres-
sion policy is approximately $9.2 billion, equivalent to 3.5% of GSP. It
follows that the value of reducing the number of infections under a
suppression policy as opposed to herd immunity policy is approxi-
mately $4.9 billion. Reduced fatalities amount to a saving of approxi-
mately $0.6 billion, while sick leave and hospitalization cost
reductions are estimated to be $4.3 billion.
Under a do nothing scenario, the number of people in need of
hospitalization is expected to surpass the number of hospital beds
40-50 days after COVID-19 is introduced to the population. This is
unlikely to happen under a herd immunity or suppression policy. In
total, COVID-19 is estimated to claim the lives of over 7 000 people
in Western Australia under a do nothing scenario. Around 75 of these
result from hospitals being overwhelmed by the number of people in
need of treatment and having to be turned away due to a lack of avail-
able hospital beds. The number of fatalities under a herd immunity
policy is likely to be around 1 700, while only nine fatalities are
predicted under a suppression scenario.
Finally, using preliminary international estimates of the eco-
nomic costs of each type of policy response on GSP, results sug-
gest that both the suppression and herd immunity policies will fail
to generate sufficient benefits to offset the costs of implementing
each policy. Net returns may be even smaller if other mental and
physical costs of response policies are incorporated into the
assessment.
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